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6.1  Introduction 
This chapter examines the role of high-conditionality lending by the 
International  Monetary Fund and the World  Bank  as a part of  the 
overall management of the debt crisis. High-conditionality lending re- 
fers to the process in which the international institutions make loans 
based on the promise of the borrowing countries to pursue a specified 
set of  policies.  High-conditionality  lending  by  both  institutions  has 
played a key role in the management of the crisis since 1982, though 
the results of such lending have rarely lived up to the advertised hopes. 
One major theme of  this chapter is that the role for high-conditionality 
lending is more restricted  than generally believed, since the efficacy 
of conditionality is inherently limited. 
A related theme is that many programs involving high-conditionality 
lending could be made more effective by including commercial bank 
debt relief  as a component of such programs.  I shall argue that such 
debt relief  can be to the benefit of the creditor banks as well as the 
debtors, by enhancing the likelihood that the debtor governments will 
adhere to the conditionality terms of the IMF and World Bank loans, 
and thereby raise their long-term capacity to service their debts. 
Almost by definition, countries in debt crisis that appeal to the Fund 
or the Bank for new  loans have  already  been judged to be uncred- 
itworthy on normal market criteria. In such treacherous circumstances, 
it is appropriate to ask why the IMF or the World  Bank  should be 
extending new loans. As an alternative, for example, the international 
institutions could allow the creditors and debtors to renegotiate  new 
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terms on the old loans without  any official involvement. Such two- 
party negotiations between creditors and debtors characterized earlier 
debt crises, before the IMF and World Bank existed (see Lindert and 
Morton, chap. 2 in this volume, for a discussion of the earlier history). 
In principle, continued lending by the international institutions could 
be justified  by  several  nonmarket criteria: as a form of  aid, as an 
investment by the creditor governments that finance the IMF and World 
Bank in political and economic stability of the debtor country (see Von 
Furstenberg  1985a; 1985b, for such a view), as an extension of  the 
foreign policy interests of the major creditor governments, as a defense 
of the international  financial system, etc. Loans are not  usually  de- 
fended on these grounds, though in fact such considerations are fre- 
quently important. Of course, these criteria are valid to an extent, but 
also extremely difficult to specify with precision as a basis for IMF- 
World Bank lending. 
Another defense of lending, also with  considerable merit in  some 
circumstances, is that the IMF (and World Bank to a far lesser extent), 
can act as a “lender of last resort,” analogous to a central bank in a 
domestic economy. The theory of the “lender of last resort”  is not 
fully developed, though the practical importance of having a domestic 
lender of last resort is not much in dispute. The conceptual argument 
goes something as follows. 
Commercial banks are at a risk of self-confirming “speculative pan- 
ics” by their depositors because the banks engage in maturity trans- 
formation of their liabilities, i.e., they borrow short term and lend long 
term (see Diamond and Dybvig  1983 for a formal model  of  banking 
panics). If the depositors suddenly get the idea that all other depositors 
are going to withdraw their funds, it is rational for each depositor to 
withdraw his  own funds from  the bank, even if  the bank  would  be 
fundamentally sound in the absence of a sudden rush of withdrawals. 
The depositors’ collective  behavior  creates a  liquidity crisis for the 
bank, in  that a fundamentally  sound intermediary  cannot satisfy the 
sudden desire of its depositors to convert their deposits to cash. A 
lender of last resort, usually the central bank, can eliminate the liquidity 
crisis by lending freely to the bank in the short term. The banking panic 
is a form of market failure, that can be overcome by a lender of last 
resort. 
The analogous  argument for the IMF would  hold  that the private 
commercial  bank lenders to a country might  similarly panic, and all 
decide to withdraw their funds from the country even though the coun- 
try is a fundamentally sound credit risk in the longer term (see Sachs 
1984 for such a model). In this case, lending by the IMF can eliminate 
the liquidity squeeze on the country, and thereby help both the creditors 
and the debtors. As in the domestic economy, the IMF helps to over- 
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This argument was part of the basis of the original IMF intervention 
in the debt crisis of the early 1980s. The argument following the Mex- 
ican crisis in mid-1982 was that countries were suffering from a liquidity 
crisis, made acute by the simultaneous rise in world interest rates and 
the sudden cessation of commercial bank lending. It seemed at  the time 
that the crisis could be quickly resolved  (as argued, for example, by 
Cline 1984), since it represented merely a liquidity squeeze. 
The liquidity arguments are no doubt true in some cases, but most 
observers now doubt that the developing country debt crisis represents 
merely a problem of liquidity. Six years after the onset of the crisis, 
almost no countries have returned to normal borrowing from the in- 
ternational  capital markets, and the secondary-market value of bank 
loans to the debtor countries reflect very deep discounts in valuation. 
For many  countries at least, the crisis represents more fundamental 
problems of solvency and longer-term willingness to pay on the part 
of the debtor nations. 
In these circumstances, other justifications (that can be in addition 
to the liquidity argument) have been advanced for the large role of IMF 
and World Bank lending, By far the most important argument is that 
strict conditionality attached to IMF-World  Bank loans can make such 
loans  sensible on normal  market terms. The assumption is  that the 
international  institutions are better than the banks at enforcing good 
behavior of the debtor country governments, and therefore have more 
scope for lending. 
The importance  of  conditionality  in  justifying  IMF-World  Bank 
lending is certainly well placed.  Countries in crisis are often in poor 
economic shape in  large part because of  bad  policy  choices in  the 
past. IMF and World Bank policies are appropriately focused on key 
policy weaknesses (excessive budget deficits in the case of the IMF, 
and  excessive inward  orientation  in  the  case of  the World  Bank). 
Moreover,  the IMF and  World  Bank  have the expertise and institu- 
tional  clout  to design  high-conditionality  programs, while  the com- 
mercial banks do not. 
Nonetheless, the role for high-conditionality  lending is overstated, 
especially in the case of countries in a deep debt crisis. In practice the 
compliance of debtor countries with conditionality is rather weak, and 
this compliance problem has gotten worse in recent years, since a large 
stock of debt can itself be an important disincentive to “good behavior.” 
In other words, the debt overhang itself makes it less likely that con- 
ditionality will prove successful. 
The reason is straightforward.  Why should a country adjust if  that 
adjustment produces income for foreign banks rather than for its own 
citizenry? Since deeply  indebted countries recognize  that  much  of 
each extra dollar of export earnings get gobbled up in debt servicing, 
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adjustment. Therefore, two counterintuitive  propositions could be true 
when a country is deeply indebted: “Good behavior”  (such as a higher 
investment rate) can actually  reduce national  welfare,  by  increasing 
the transfer of income from the debtor country to creditors; and ex- 
plicit debt relief  by the creditors can increase the amounts of actual 
debt repayment, by improving the incentive of the debtor country to 
make the necessary adjustments. 
Before turning to these arguments at greater length, we should con- 
sider one additional argument sometimes made for official lending. The 
argument is occasionally made that since countries are more averse to 
defaulting on official loans than they are on private loans, it is safe for 
official  creditors to lend even when  private  creditors will  not. This 
argument can sometimes be correct, but it is often mistaken. If official 
loans just raise  the country’s debt burden without  raising  its  debt- 
servicing capacity, then repayments to the official creditors might sim- 
ply crowd out repayments to its private creditors, and thereby under- 
mine the smooth functioning of the international capital markets. 
The issues of conditionality and debt relief will be discussed as fol- 
lows. Section 6.2 outlines the theory of conditionality and section 6.3 
focuses on the empirical record of high-conditionality  lending. Section 
6.4 shows the linkages  between the overhang of debt and the effec- 
tiveness of conditionality, and demonstrates the potential role for debt 
relief in high-conditionality lending. Section 6.5 then discusses the spe- 
cific problems  raised  by  the macroeconomic situation of the heavily 
indebted countries: high inflation, excessive inward orientation, large 
budget deficits, and a prolonged economic downturn, all exacerbated 
by  the problem  of  high foreign indebtedness. The recent history  of 
stabilization has shown that few countries have been able to solve even 
one or two of these problems at a time, much less all of them simul- 
taneously, and the record suggests that adjustment programs have the 
highest probability of success when macroeconomic stabilization pre- 
cedes large-scale trade liberalization and a shift to outward orientation. 
6.2  High-Conditionality Lending by the IMF and World Bank 
The argument for high-conditionality lending is that the IMF and the 
World Bank can compel countries to undertake stabilizing actions in 
return for loans, thereby making  the loans prudent even when  the 
private capital markets have declared the country to be uncreditworthy. 
A full theory of conditionality would have to explain three things. First, 
if the actions being recommended to the country are really “desirable” 
for the country, why is it that the country must be compelled to un- 
dertake the policy? Second, if  the country must indeed be compelled 
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used to guarantee compliance? And third, why is it that international 
institutions are better able to impose conditionality than are the private 
capital markets? 
One solution to the conundrum of why countries must be compelled 
to accept conditionality is the problem of “time consistency”: a debtor 
government accepts ex ante the need for a policy adjustment as the 
quid pro quo for a loan, but the government has a strong incentive to 
avoid the policy change once the loan is arranged. In this case, the role 
of conditionality is to bind the country to a course of future actions, 
actions which make sense today but which will look unattractive in the 
future. In other words, the goal of conditionality is to make the ex ante 
and ex post incentives for adjustment the same (where ex ante and ex 
post are with respect to the receipt of the loan). 
In earlier papers (Sachs 1984; Cooper and Sachs 1985), I gave a simple 
illustration of a case in  which  conditionality  was appropriate. I will 
discuss that case here, relegating  the formal model to appendix  A. 
Suppose that a government faces the problem of allocating resources 
between consumption and investment. The government has a very high 
time-discount  rate (0.30 for purposes of illustration),  so that current 
consumption is much preferred to future consumption. The investment 
opportunities have a return (0.20) in excess of the world interest rate 
(0.10), but less than the time discount rate. 
The problem is the following. Once the foreign loans are obtained, 
and the government has to decide how to allocate over time the total 
pool of resources (equal to domestic resources plus foreign borrowing), 
the government will choose to consume rather than  invest. That is 
because its time discount rate exceeds the rate of return on investment, 
so that it does not pay to sacrifice consumption expenditures in order 
to raise  investment. For concreteness we  suppose that a particular 
export-oriented investment project  costs $100 million, and therefore 
yields $120 million in the future. 
We  assume that without investment the country will not have the 
resources to pay off a loan in the following period. The government is 
then assumed to pay off as much as it can, and to default on the rest. 
Under these conditions, private foreign lenders will not lend much to 
this country since they correctly foresee that the government will not 
invest the money. The situation can be depicted simply as a two-stage 
game between the creditors and the borrower. The creditor must first 
decide whether to lend; the borrower then decides whether to invest. 
As illustrated in figure 6.la, once the money is received, the govern- 
ment’s  “utility”  is higher by  consuming today rather than investing 
(utility is assumed to be equal to consumption, with future consumption 
discounted by the rate of time preference). In particular, the country 
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defaulting on the loans, but only 8 if  the loan is used for investment. 
Because the country’s incentive to consume and then default is rec- 
ognized by potential private creditors, the country is a bad credit risk. 
Since the loan will not in fact be made, the country’s utility from the 
loan is of course 0.0 (the arrows indicate the equilibrium choices). 
On the other hand, if  the country could commit itself to increase in- 
vestment by the amount of the foreign loans, as shown in figure 6.  Ib, it 
would result in a better outcome for the country specifically, a utility of 
8 rather than 0.0. (As shown, the lender is indifferent between the two 
cases, because the lender just gets repaid with zero profit in the case 
6.  lb. In reality, the lender would presumably strictly prefer the case of 
lending with repayment to the case of no lending.) Since the investment 261  Conditionality, Debt Relief, and the Debt Crisis 
opportunities have a return that is higher than the world cost of bor- 
rowing, the returns to the investment will be more than enough to pay 
off the loans. Moreover, since the investment is foreign financed, un- 
dertaking it does not have to reduce current consumption. Thus, if the 
country can commit itself to use foreign loans for investment purposes, 
the country will  (1) maintain current consumption levels and (2) gen- 
erate out of the investment project more than enough future income 
necessary to repay the debt. In sum, it is advantageous for the gov- 
ernment to try to “tie its hands,” and commit itself to use new foreign 
money for investment rather than consumption purposes. 
The role for conditionality is introduced by assuming that countries 
cannot make credible, enforceable commitments with private lenders 
to use loans for one purpose or another, but that by means of condi- 
tionality  agreements with  the IMF or World  Bank, the country can 
commit itself to a particular investment program.  In such a case, it 
would be safe for the IMF or World Bank to make high conditionality 
loans to the country (since the loans will be used for investment pur- 
poses), while it would be imprudent for the private sector to make the 
same loans (since without conditionality, the government will consume 
the proceeds of the loan rather than invest). 
The remaining problem with conditionality comes from the fact that 
once the IMF or World Bank lending is received, the country has the 
incentive to renege on its investment commitment. Given the prefer- 
ences of the government, it is always better to consume than to invest 
once a level of foreign loans has been established. Thus, there must 
be some way for the country or the IMF and World Bank to guarantee 
that the commitment to invest is actually honored. 
In practice, bargaining  over conditionality almost always involves 
more than the debtor government’s binding itself to a specific path of 
policies. Bargaining between a debtor country and the IMF and World 
Bank may also involve an implicit dispute about which objective func- 
tion to use in evaluating a set of outcomes. If a program will lead to a 
recession next year, but a recovery over the following several years, 
is it desirable? The answer may well be “yes” to the Fund or the Bank 
(or their creditor governments, which recognize that adjustment may 
involve short-run pain  in return for long-run benefits), but the same 
answer might be “no”  to a precarious regime that might lose power 
during a period of austerity. Openness about this difference of opinion 
would block the signing of many agreements. In practice, neither the 
Fund or Bank on the one hand  nor the creditor government on the 
other fully admit their disagreements, so that many conditionality pack- 
ages are signed that have little chance of fulfillment, a point I return 
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6.2.1  Official versus Private Lending in IMF-World  Bank Packages 
In the framework just described, the major role for the IMF and the 
World Bank is to guarantee through conditionality that the country will 
use a new loan for investment rather than consumption. We  have dis- 
cussed the issue as if  the loan itself would come from the monitoring 
institutions, but in fact, there is no reason why there could not instead 
be a division of labor: The international institutions  impose the con- 
ditionality ;  the private capital markets provide the financing. This is a 
well-recognized idea, that the international institutions should act mainly 
to provide “a  seal of good  housekeeping,”  and thereby  to catalyze 
private lending. 
Since the outbreak of the debt crisis, the IMF and World Bank have 
often emphasized such a catalytic role. One of the major innovations 
early in the crisis was the IMF’s insistence to the commercial banks 
that any new IMF program for Mexico would  require that the com- 
mercial banks commit $5 billion of additional lending to Mexico as  well. 
Thus began the pattern of “involuntary”  or “nonspontaneous”  bank 
lending, in which the banks agreed to commit new lending to a debtor 
country in  proportion to their existing  exposures to the country, as 
part of an IMF stabilization package. More recently, private cofinancing 
with  the World  Bank  has also been  added as a  condition of  some 
package agreements (e.g., the Argentine agreement in  1986). 
The details of such loan packages are beyond the scope of this chap- 
ter, and have been discussed at some length by  Sachs and Huizinga 
(1987). Here it  suffices  to point  out the extremely limited  nature of 
such financing, and that the “catalytic”  role  of the IMF and  World 
Bank have been vastly overstated (this may be a result of the lack of 
credibility  of the conditionality,  for reasons suggested  below). Three 
points can be made here. First, overall net bank lending to the problem 
debtor countries were negative during  1982-86,  not positive. That is, 
loan amortizations exceeded new  lending,  even after taking into ac- 
count all of the well-publicized “concerted lending” arrangement. The 
concerted lending has been sporadic, and small in absolute magnitude, 
compared with the levels of debt amortizations in recent years. Thus, 
the levels of commercial bank exposure in the debtor countries actually 
fell after the onset of the crisis. 
Second, the new  lending  by  the commercial banks,  where  it  has 
occurred, has almost always fallen far short of the debt servicing pay- 
ments made by the debtor countries to the creditor banks. In this sense, 
the net resource transfers from the banks to the major debtor countries 
has been highly negative in recent years, despite the occasional appli- 
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Third, and perhaps most disturbing, the IMF has not devoted much 
energy to getting concerted lending programs for the smaller debtor 
countries,  but only for the larger countries (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, and 
Mexico). Almost no debtor country with  an outstanding debt below 
$5 billion  has been  able to get any concerted lending from its com- 
mercial bank creditors, as is shown in table 6 in Sachs and Huizinga 
(1987). The smaller and politically weaker debtor countries have ap- 
parently had to make much larger net resource transfers than have their 
larger fellow debtor countries. 
6.2.2  Enforcement of Conditionality Agreements: The Theory 
The question of enforcement of conditionality agreements is in many 
ways tougher than the question of why conditionality is needed. The 
justification  for IMF-World  Bank  lending rests on two propositions 
regarding enforcement: (1) that the enforcement of IMF-World  Bank 
conditionality is sufficiently powerful to result in an “acceptable”  rate 
of compliance with IMF-World  Bank programs and (2) that the official 
institutions have an advantage over the commercial banks in enforcing 
conditionality. In both this section and the next, I examine the validity 
of these views. 
6.2.3  The Strength of Conditionality 
For both the international institutions and the commercial banks, the 
legal bases of conditionality are weak. In the domestic capital markets, 
bond covenants are legally binding restrictions on the behavior of debt- 
ors, which  can generally  be  enforced  with  only  modest transaction 
costs. In the international  arena, particularly  for loans to sovereign 
governments, the transaction costs for enforcing loan agreements are 
extremely  high.  As most writers  have recognized  recently,  the main 
method of enforcement for lenders (whether official or private) involves 
the threat of cutoffs of new loans to misbehaving  borrowers. Such a 
cutoff in lending can of course be extremely disruptive and costly to 
a borrower. Bank creditors can cut back on short-term trade credits 
to a country, and thereby disrupt the flow of international trade in the 
short term. The IMF similarly can cut back on balance-of-payments 
support, and by doing so, also trigger the cutoff of lending from other 
official sources (e.g., the World Bank, the bilateral official creditors, 
the multilateral  development banks). 
Theoretical work and empirical evidence both establish that the threat 
of a lending cutoff is a credible, but inherently limited sanction. Thus, 
conditionality, whether by the IMF and World Bank, or by the com- 
mercial banks themselves, should not on an a priori basis be expected 
to have the same force as a binding bond covenant in a domestic loan. 264  Jeffrey D. Sachs 
From the beginning, we should appreciate the inherent limitations of 
the enforcement mechanisms in conditionality on international lending. 
6.2.4  The Special Problem of Negotiating with a Sovereign 
Borrower 
Conditionality  is  limited  in  effectiveness  not only  because of  en- 
forcement difficulties, but also because of the complexity of negotiating 
with a sovereign borrower. In the case of  a bond covenant, there is a 
clear legal responsibility on the borrower to carry out the conditions 
of the covenant. When a government is the debtor, however, there is 
likely to be a considerable diffusion of power within the government, 
to the extent that the individual parts of the government negotiating 
the conditionality agreement may well lack the authority to implement 
the agreement. 
This problem is common with IMF agreements, though it is rarely 
discussed or carefully analyzed. The IMF invariably negotiates  with 
the executive branch, and mainly with  a small part of the executive 
branch, the finance ministry. A small group of technocrats at the min- 
istry of finance and at the central bank will typically negotiate the IMF 
agreement in  private, and in  splendid isolation from the rest of the 
government. However, when the minister of finance signs the agree- 
ment with the Fund, very often there can be little assurance that the 
minister has the authority or political standing within the government 
to carry out the agreement. This is especially the case when the minister 
agrees to spending and tax changes that require parliamentary approval, 
or that require the approval of other parts of the government (inde- 
pendent state enterprises, regional  corporations, state and municipal 
governments, other ministries, etc.). Often, it is the president himself 
that undercuts his finance minister in the execution of  an adjustment 
program. 
In this  sense, most IMF and  World  Bank agreements start with  a 
formal myth, that there is one unified actor in the government that can 
be bound by the terms of a conditionality agreement. This may be a 
necessary myth, and even sometimes a useful one, but uncovering the 
myth helps us in a simple way to account for the fact that most IMF 
agreements fail, a point we shall see below. 
6.2.5  The Debt Overhang and the Weakness of Conditionality 
What must also be appreciated is the fact that the current overhang 
of external debt to private creditors can greatly hinder the effectiveness 
of IMF conditionality, at least under the prevailing design of IMF pro- 
grams. Virtually all IMF programs to date have been designed under 
the assumption that the debtor country can and will service its external 
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constructed in the expectation of normal debt servicing. (For example, 
in the technical calculations  in Fund programs, interest rates on the 
existing debt are assumed to be at market rates; the country is assumed 
to clear all arrears on a reasonable timetable, etc.) 
It might easily be the case, however, that a country would be better 
off defaulting on a portion of its debts than it would  be with timely 
debt servicing (a dozen or more countries had indeed taken such uni- 
lateral  action by  1987). There simply  may  not  exist an  IMF high- 
conditionality program based on full debt servicing, that, if followed, 
would actually make the country better off than it would be without 
the program but with a partial suspension of debt payments. In other 
words, the IMF program might be too restrictive relative to the avail- 
able options of the debtor government. 
In such circumstances, four things could happen. One outcome would 
be for the IMF to design a program that is actually based on partial 
and explicit debt relief. So far, the IMF has avoided this rather obvious 
approach, partly because it has underestimated  the possible efficiency 
gains for all parties (creditors, debtors, and the Fund) that might result. 
The second possibility is that the IMF  and the debtor government would 
fail to sign a program, and the country would  suspend payments on 
the part of its private sector debts. This has been the case with Peru 
during 1985-87,  and Brazil in  1987. The third possibility,  and indeed 
the typical case in recent years, is that the Fund and the country would 
sign a program based on full debt servicing, even though both parties 
fully expect that the agreement will breakdown in due course. Either 
the conditionality  would  be allowed  to fall by  the wayside  and the 
country would continue to borrow from the Fund but without living 
up to earlier commitments, or the IMF program would eventually be 
suspended. 
Argentina during 1987-88 provides an ideal illustration of the case in 
which the IMF and a debtor country signed a series of agreements in 
which almost no observers had any confidence, and in which the IMF 
simply relaxed the conditionality terms (with formal waivers) through- 
out the course of the agreement. Mr. David Finch, the former director 
of the IMF Department of Exchange and Trade Relations, writes of Ar- 
gentina as a case of “renewed pressures to involve the IMF  in an agree- 
ment where political solutions [in Argentina] won’t allow a solution to 
the balance-of-payments problem. . . . [Tlhe IMF has been forced to 
continue lending [to  Argentina] to maintain the facade of the debt strat- 
egy.” (Finch, 1988, 127). In less diplomatic language, the U.S. govern- 
ment was fearful that Argentina would default to the commercial banks 
in the absence of new IMF money. The U.S. therefore pressured the 
Fund to maintain a program with Argentina despite the failure of the 
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A fourth possibility would be for the IMF and World Bank to approve 
programs with debtor countries that allow for a buildup of arrears (i.e., 
nonpayments) to the commercial bank creditors, in  well-defined cir- 
cumstances. These circumstances would include (1) a large overhang 
of debt that is deemed to be highly inimical to the stabilization efforts 
of the country and (2) the unwillingness  of the commercial creditors 
either to grant relief or significant new financing. By allowing for the 
buildup  of  arrears to private  creditors, the  IMF could  design  more 
realistic programs without the need to press the private creditors for 
specific amounts of debt relief. The debt relief would instead emerge 
in the bilateral bargaining of the debtor and the creditors. 
In a later section, we will explore in much greater detail the case for 
combining conditionality with debt relief. 
6.2.6  The Strength of Official versus Private Conditionality 
It remains to be asked whether the Fund and the Bank have more 
power than the private banks in imposing conditionality on sovereign 
borrowers. Here, experience will have to provide the most conclusive 
answers, and we discuss the historical experience in the next section. 
Some theoretical  arguments, though, can be made as follows. First, 
the Fund and the Bank are ongoing institutions, while bank syndicates 
are ad hoc. Defaulting to the Fund or the Bank will presumably  put 
the country at risk of rupturing the relations  with  these institutions, 
while  defaulting to some private  creditors in  a particular syndicate 
might not forestall further borrowing from new lenders elsewhere. 
Second, enforcement of loans raises several problems of collective 
action. With hundreds or even more than a thousand private creditors 
for a major debtor country, there is a problem in allocating the moni- 
toring and enforcement costs of a conditionality agreement that might 
be reached between the country and the creditors. With the Fund or 
the Bank, a  single actor bears the enforcement costs and reaps the 
rewards of enforcement. Third, it is sometimes suggested that the Fund 
or the Bank can dictate terms to a country while the private sector 
cannot because it  is  easier for the country to be  responding  to an 
independent political  institution  than it  is  for the country to be re- 
sponding to “private capital.” 
Fourth, and perhaps most important, the creditor governments have 
made IMF conditionality the practical linchpin of all a debtor country’s 
financial relations with the creditor governments. With few exceptions, 
a debtor country in crisis must have an ongoing relationship with the 
IMF in order to qualify for (1) a rescheduling of official bilateral (i.e., 
government-to-government) loans in  the Paris Club; (2) new  credits 
from official export credit agencies to the debtor government; (3) new 
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(even if  there is no formal cross-conditionality  clause between IMF 
and World Bank lending, there is often implicit cross-conditionality). 
In addition, debtor countries are often instructed by the United States 
to maintain good relations  with the IMF in order to maintain good 
bilateral  relations with the United States. Thus, a country’s concern 
about foreign policy relations with the United States often strengthens 
the hand of the IMF. 
On  the other side of  the ledger,  the public  institutions  also have 
several  disadvantages in  enforcement power relative  to the private 
sector. With respect to the first point, banks are also ongoing institu- 
tions well aware of their reputations. They have so far been extremely 
reluctant to ease the repayment terms for any country (for example to 
reschedule at below market interest rates), even for countries in dire 
straits, because of  the demonstration effect on  the dozens of  other 
countries with which these banks are bargaining. 
Second, with respect to the free-rider problems of enforcement, the 
banks have worked out ways to get around many of the collective action 
problems involved in monitoring and rescheduling. For example, small 
steering committees of banks are appointed to manage the negotiations 
with the debtor countries. A small number of banks is entrusted with 
most of the actual mechanics of oversight and negotiation. Syndicated 
loan agreements now often contain provisions for certain binding ac- 
tions by the entire syndicate upon a favorable vote of some fraction of 
the syndicate members. This kind of procedure can help to eliminate 
the problem of individual banks attempting to free ride on the actions 
of others. 
Moreover, in some cases, the presence of hundreds of small banks 
can actually  strengthen the bargaining  position of a bank  syndicate. 
The steering committee is able to point out in some circumstances that 
even the small banks might ruin an agreement, so that the country must 
accede to better terms for these weak  links in the chain. When  the 
country is negotiating with a single creditor such as  the IMF, this appeal 
of the creditor to the “weak” fringe members of the bargaining team 
cannot be made. 
As to the third  point, that  it  is  easier for a government to take 
marching orders from the international public institutions rather than 
from private banks, the evidence is at best mixed. The epithet that a 
program is fondo monetaristu is about as damning as possible in the 
Latin American  political  lexicon.  Indeed, there are several cases in 
recent years in which countries have explicitly attempted private work- 
outs with the banks, in order to avoid the opprobrium of agreeing to a 
Fund program. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the World Bank and the IMF 
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they are clients of the very governments to whom they are lending the 
money.  It may be hard indeed for the IMF or World Bank to tell  a 
member government to go away. To  the credit of the Fund and the 
Bank, these organizations  have developed  several institutional levels 
of technical staff that intervene between the country and a final decision 
with respect to lending. 
Because of the formal position of the multilateral agencies as clients 
of the member governments, there is a need for a formal equality of 
treatment for all member governments with regard to negotiations.  It 
is very difficult for the Fund or the Bank to make invidious comparisons 
among countries concerning the likelihood that they will actually live 
up to commitments. If a program looks good on paper, there are great 
pressures for the program to be approved, even if there is widespread 
skepticism that the program will actually be carried out. The Fund of 
course keeps track of the compliance record of member governments, 
but it appears to be difficult to make that record a formal basis for 
approving  or disapproving  a program, assuming that the country is 
current in its repayments to the Fund and assuming that on paper a 
proposed program hangs together. 
Another problem is that the Fund and the Bank have many goals 
other than profits, which can make them a soft touch with respect to 
conditionality. For the private capital markets, there is basically  one 
bottom line: Will the loan make money? The Bank and the Fund must 
also worry  about the political  stability  of  the recipient  country, the 
political interests of the creditor governments, the standard of living 
of individuals in the debtor countries, etc. These are admirable con- 
cerns, indeed crucial concerns. They are the raison d’&tre  of interna- 
tional institutions. But these concerns do not always allow for a hard- 
boiled judgment about the potential success  or  failure of a conditionality 
package. 
These limitations of the IMF are pointed out by Finch (1988), who 
cites the case of IMF relations  with  Egypt as an important example 
(we have already noted Finch’s observations with regard to Argentina): 
For political reasons, Egypt had been receiving sizable support from 
the Western allies, much of it in the form of repayable export credits. 
With  very  limited  cash  aid available, servicing this credit  became 
virtually impossible. Yet, debt relief was blocked by Paris Club rules 
that required that Egypt have an agreement with the IMF before the 
creditor countries would reschedule their loans. To  maintain even a 
semblance of its traditional concern for timely repayment, the IMF 
had to insist on major changes in Egypt’s economic policies. 
But the Egyptian government, fearing a domestic political back- 
lash, refused to take the required action. Instead, it sought protection 
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with  Egypt without  insisting  on the necessary policy  changes. In 
recompense, undoubtedly, the IMF was given assured priority over 
other creditors (p. 127). 
In sum, the power of conditionality is certainly present in the case 
of IMF  and World Bank lending, though conditionality will face inherent 
restrictions, given the limited enforcement powers at hand. The alleged 
superiority of the international institutions in imposing conditionality 
is probably  correct in general but much oversold quantitatively.  The 
private sector can indeed impose conditionality, and has done so in the 
past.  At the same time, the conditionality emanating from the inter- 
national institutions is hobbled by the nature of the relationship of those 
institutions to the member governments. In the last analysis, the suc- 
cess or failure of conditionality is an empirical matter, and it is to the 
historical record that we turn shortly. 
6.2.7  Enhancing the Strength of  Conditionality 
Even before proceeding to the empirical record, we can already make 
several points regarding ways to enhance the effectiveness  of condi- 
tionality  agreements. First, given the weakness of conditionality, the 
IMF and the World Bank probably undermine their effectiveness by 
signing too many (unrealistic) programs.  In cases which appear par- 
ticularly  unrealistic,  the IMF and World Bank can protect the condi- 
tionality  process by  requiring more prior  actions on the part of the 
borrowing government, so that the government proves its resolve to 
carry through  on the negotiated program  (and is forced to build  the 
domestic political base for the policy changes). 
Second, if  one source of unreality is the heavy burden represented 
by a large overhang of debt, the IMF and World Bank would increase 
the likelihood of success by endorsing some programs  that allow for 
arrears to private-sector creditors, if those creditors are unprepared to 
allow for a realistic extent of debt relief. Furthermore, as we shall see, 
this point applies more generally to encouraging formal debt relief as 
part of overall IMF-World  Bank programs. 
6.3  The Recent Experience with Conditionality 
The recent experience of the World Bank with high-conditionality 
lending in support of macroeconomic adjustment is rather limited, so 
that most of the discussion will focus on the outcomes of IMF  programs. 
Moreover, measuring the success of Fund programs is a daunting task, 
because the inevitable refrain is “compared to what?” (See Williamson 
1983, chap. 7, for an interesting discussion of possible bases for eval- 
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programs  in terms of the compliance of the debtor government with 
the terms of the IMF agreement. Even this limited type of assessment 
is difficult, both because compliance is multidimensional, and because 
many of the details of the programs (particularly the contents of  the 
letters of intent) are typically beyond the public view. Because of this 
latter feature, we must  rely almost wholly on studies of  compliance 
undertaken by the Fund itself, or  on case studies of individual countries 
by outside authors. 
Of  course the design  of  IMF conditionality  loans, and  to a lesser 
extent, World Bank Structural Adjustment  Loans (SALs), have been 
subject to intense criticism and debate among policy makers and ac- 
ademic economists. These debates often make it appear that the fun- 
damental diagnoses underlying such loans, and the conditions attached 
to them remain in serious dispute. However, the problem of diagnosis 
is almost surely not the main source of the problem with compliance. 
At a recent conference reviewing IMF conditionality (see Williamson 
1983), Richard Cooper conjectured (pp. 571-73)  that despite their dif- 
fering theoretical views, the conference participants would find them- 
selves in broad agreement in designing a stabilization program for any 
specific country other than their own. He went on to say that the chosen 
stabilization program would probably look quite like a “standard” IMF 
package. Notably, there were few demurrals, despite the wide range 
of theoretical positions represented at the conference. 
In that conference (and in the country studies in the NBER Project 
on Developing Country Debt) there was much evidence for the pre- 
vailing IMF and World Bank views that (1) balance of payments prob- 
lems typically reflect, inter alia, excessive money creation in support 
of fiscal  deficits; (2) multiple  exchange rate systems lead to serious 
resource misallocations, and are often a burden on public-sector bud- 
gets; (3) overvalued exchange rates, coupled with exchange controls, 
capital flight, and smuggling, represent a tax on exports that is detri- 
mental to long-term development; and (4) allowing key prices (including 
real wages, public-sector prices, and interest rates) to respond to mar- 
ket  conditions  as part  of  an overall  adjustment effort will  improve 
efficiency and growth. 
Ironically, though, there was one more point of agreement running 
through most of the analyses at the Williamson conference (and the 
NBER studies): IMF programs  are very  frequently,  if  not  typically, 
unsuccessful  in restoring stability and growth in countries beset with 
balance-of-payments  and inflation  problems. Aside from the cases of 
the developed country borrowers (Italy, the United Kingdom, and Por- 
tugal) discussed at the conference, several of the remaining programs 
that were described (Argentina,  Brazil, Jamaica, Tanzania) were un- 
successful in meeting stated objectives. These findings of  limited suc- 
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cross-sectional analyses of IMF stabilization programs, which in sum 
point to a mixed record, at the very best, in the compliance of countries 
with Fund programs. (Notably, however, in the cases where Fund pro- 
grams were substantially implemented, the macroeconomic results seem 
to justify the conditions attached to the loans.) 
Internal IMF reviews of compliance are similarly mixed. In a review 
of Fund programs supported by standby arrangements in upper-credit 
tranches during 1969-78, Beveridge and Kelley (1980) found that fiscal 
targets were achieved in about half the cases, but, “[bly 1977 and 1978, 
expenditures were contained as planned in less than 20 percent of the 
programs, compared with over 50 percent in  1969 and 1970” (p. 213). 
Also, Beveridge and Kelley found that governments were not generally 
successful in  meeting targets  with respect to the composition  of ex- 
penditure  between current and capital outlays. In over 70 percent of 
the programs specifying a desire to expand capital outlays while con- 
straining current outlays (exactly the form of conditionality considered 
in the theoretical  model), “current expenditure in nominal terms ex- 
ceeded the target or projection. In about half of these programs, capital 
outlays in  nominal  terms were lower than projected”  (p. 214). With 
respect to the target on overall budget balance, as opposed to expen- 
ditures alone, budget targets were met in about 50 percent of the pro- 
grams overall, but  in  less than 20 percent of the programs  in  1978. 
Once again, a sharp downturn in compliance was noted. Doe’s study 
(1983) has updated the Beveridge and Kelley results for Fund programs 
in  1980. Of the 18 programs surveyed that planned a reduction in the 
fiscal deficit, half of the programs did result in a reduced deficit, but 
in  only 4 (22 percent) of the cases did the country actually meet the 
agreed-upon targets. 
Stephan Haggard’s (1985) recent review of IMF programs under the 
Extended Fund Facility (EFF) is no more heartening. The EFF was 
created in  1974 in the wake of the first oil shock as a way to enlarge 
the access of  IMF member countries to Fund credits. The goals were 
similar to those enunciated for the Baker plan. In Haggard’s words, 
the EFFs “are representative of a growing emphasis among develop- 
ment economists on the importance of microeconomic instruments and 
on the role of resource utilization and production as a basis for longer- 
term structural adjustment. EFFs often call for fundamental shifts in 
policy, such as liberalization of trade, decontrol of prices, and restruc- 
turing of public-sector corporations” (p. 508). The results of the EFFs 
were poor. According to Haggard, in his count, “of the thirty adjust- 
ment  programs  launched  under the auspices of the Extended  Fund 
Facility, twenty-four were renegotiated,  or had payments interrupted, 
or were quietly allowed  to lapse. Of these twenty-four,  sixteen were 
formally  cancelled  by  the  IMF,  virtually  all  for  noncompliance” 
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Haggard’s bleak conclusions are echoed in a recent study by Remmer 
(1986), of IMF programs during 1954-84.  It is worth quoting Remmer 
at length on the question of IMF conditionality: 
Unsuccessful implementation of IMF recipes has been the norm in 
Latin  America, not  the  exception.  A  high  proportion  of  standby 
programs have failed to push key indicators of government finance 
and domestic credit even in the right direction. Moreover, examining 
the IMF standby programs on a before and after basis shows that 
changes in  key  indicators are more readily  attributable to chance 
than to the operation of  IMF stabilization  programs. The obvious 
conclusion is that the economic, social, and political impact of IMF 
programs has been overstated. To describe the IMF as a “poverty 
broker,”  as does the title of a recent book, or to charge the Fund 
with undermining democracy is to engage in hyperbole. The power 
of the IMF remains a useful myth for governments seeking a scape- 
goat to explain difficult economic conditions associated with severe 
balance-of-payments disequilibria,  but the ability of the IMF to im- 
pose programs from the outside is distinctly limited (p. 21). 
Given all  these unsatisfactory results,  it is  not surprising  that the 
Fund has been unable to wean many countries away from IMF support, 
in spite of being only “temporarily available.”  Table 6.1, taken from 
Goode (1985), shows the list of  24  countries that have used Fund re- 
sources consecutively for a period  of at least  10 years. Note that of 
these 24  cases, fully  19 are still using IMF resources as of  1984. In 
other words, the lengthy  reliance  on Fund loans is a contemporary 
feature of the system. This table, by definition, does not include even 
more problematic  cases, in  which  the country’s performance under 
Fund programs was so unsatisfactory that its access to further Fund 
credits was suspended. 
The experience with the World Bank SALs is too brief to allow any 
such comparable review.  By design  these programs are intended to 
yield results only in the intermediate term (say 5-15  years), so that no 
comprehensive judgments can yet be made. However, there are already 
some very worrisome signs that the compliance with Bank condition- 
ality  is  no better than with  the Fund’s. In a review  of  recent  SAL 
experience, Berg and Batchelder (1985) note that three (Senegal, Guy- 
ana, Bolivia) of sixteen SAL countries have already experienced a clear 
breakdown of a program in process or a denial of a follow-up of SAL 
because of inadequate performance. These authors are also skeptical 
of the strength of Bank conditionality,  pointing to the case of Senegal 
(whose SAL was cancelled in mid-1983) as an example of the nonen- 
forceability  of conditionality: 
As noted  earlier the Bank must shrink from the ultimate  sanction, 
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Table 6.1  Members Making Prolonged Use of IMF Credit in the Period 
1954-84" 
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Sources: From Goode (1985), table 3, which is based on International Monetary Fund, 
International  Financial Statistics: Supplement on Fund Accounts, no. 3 (1982); IMF, 
International Financial Statistics Yearbook,  1984; IMF, Infernational  Finuncial Statistics 
(February 1985, p. 22-23). 
aPeriods of use are measured between the ends of calendar years and are, therefore, 
understated for all transactions occurring before 31  December of the years in question; 
the maximum understatement can approach two years. 
bYugoslavia also had an 11-year period of use from 1959 through 1969. 
the Bank to banal  acts of nonperformance. In the one case where 
this  was done (Senegal), the SAL was replaced  by  new  credits. 
Noncompliance,  at least in the short run, was virtually costless to 
Senegal, whose share of Bank-IDA disbursements has been 50 per- 
cent higher, during July-February  of fiscal  1984, than it was during 
fiscal  1981 and 1982. . . . [Hlowever, new Bank-IDA commitments 
to Senegal have dropped off, and it is not clear when that decline 
will be reversed (p. 44). 
The record of failed SAL  programs (3 out of 16 countries) may well 
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become important for the Latin American countries. Many of the ex- 
isting SALs cover the successful middle-income developing countries 
and the NICs, such as Thailand  and Korea, rather than the problem 
cases of Peru, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, or Mexico. 
6.4  External Debt and Conditionality 
The theme  of  this  section is  that  high  external  indebtedness  can 
reduce the incentives for a country to undertake necessary macroeco- 
nomic adjustments, and thus further reduce the chance that the terms 
of  a conditionality  agreement will  be  fulfilled.  Indeed, for very  high 
levels of indebtedness, it may be useful for creditors to forgive some 
of  the debt as an incentive for better performance, recognizing  that 
such an incentive could actually raise the repayments to creditors in 
the long run. Before proceeding with this argument, a terminological 
point must be made. Creditors frequently “write down” the value of 
bad loans in their own books, without relieving the debtor of the legal 
obligation to make full  repayments. The thrust of  this  section is not 
about writedowns (which may be wise from an accounting or regulatory 
point  of view), but about explicit  relief  or forgiveness, in  which the 
creditors reduce the legal  obligations  of  repayment below  the levels 
originally contracted. 
6.4.1 
Let us see how debt forgiveness can work (once again the technical 
material is presented at the end of the chapter in appendix B). Suppose 
that a  country has  a large  stock of  debt due in  the future. He will 
assume, for purposes of illustration, that the stock of debt is so large 
that the country lacks creditworthiness for any additional  borrowing 
on international private markets. Moreover, to avoid complications, 
we  will for the moment ignore conditionality  lending.  Finally,  by as- 
suming that the debt is due in the future rather than the present, we 
ignore issues relating to rescheduling. 
The existing creditors have a choice this period: They can sit down 
with  the country and negotiate  some debt relief,  or they can “hang 
tough” today, and hope to get fully repaid in the future. It might seem 
that, and it is often argued as if, the creditors should hold out for the 
maximum repayment, and take whatever they can get in  the future. 
After all, why give up on full repayment today, before the debt is due? 
This is certainly the attitude of many banks, who recognize that they 
are unlikely to be repaid fully but have decided to sit tight until further 
developments occur. Unfortunately. this strategy may well ultimately 
leave the banks with  smaller repayments than they would receive by 
negotiating forgiveness in some circumstances. 
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When the debt overhang is large enough, it can act as a major in- 
centive against the very adjustments in the debtor country that would 
contribute to future debt servicing, as can be shown by a simple nu- 
merical example. Suppose that the country owes $150 million, but has 
a future capacity for debt servicing of only $100 million. Suppose also 
that in the future the country will repay (in present value terms) as 
much  of  the $150 million  as possible,  and  will  then default  on the 
balance. Note that improvements in the country’s future debt-servicing 
capacity (up to $150 million) would simply go to the creditors’ benefit, 
and not the country’s, since the overhang of debt is so large. 
Suppose, for instance, that a wonderful investment opportunity is 
available for enhancing exports. If  the debtor government sacrifices 
$10 million of current consumption and raises investments in the export 
sector, it will raise its future debt-servicing capacity from $100 million 
to $120 million. From the creditors’ point of view this would be quite 
beneficial.  But from the country’s point of view, it  would be highly 
irrational. The country would lose $10 million in consumption today, 
and would gain nothing in consumption in the future, since all of the 
added export earnings would go to the creditors, and the export earn- 
ings would still not be enough to repay the debt! The benefits of higher 
future production would fall entirely to the creditors. 
Since the government will not undertake the investments in  such 
circumstances, it is most likely that the debt-servicing capacity of the 
country will  not  be enhanced. The debtor will  not  adjust  (i.e., the 
export-promoting investments will  not  be  made).  The future  debt- 
servicing capacity will remain at $100 million, which is the amount that 
the creditors will receive in the future. 
Now suppose instead that the creditors offer some debt relief. The 
creditors might agree to forgive $45  million, and to continue to demand 
$105 million of repayments (i.e., the creditors settle for 70 cents on the 
dollar). This could be done, for example, by a swap of the outstanding 
$150 million  of debt for exit  bonds  with face value of $105 million. 
Now, if  the country invests, it loses $10 million in consumption today, 
gains $20 million in additional export earnings in the future (total export 
earnings now equal $120 million), and repays $105 million in debt (i.e., 
the exit bonds would be fully serviced). Future consumption therefore 
rises by $15 million (= $120 million -  $105 million), with a discounted 
utility gain of -  10  + 15/(1.3), or about $2 million. Since the govern- 
ment’s rate of time discount is not too high, the opportunity to pay 
$10 million in current consumption in order to raise future consumption 
by $15 million is attractive, and the investment will be made. 
In sum, by agreeing  to debt relief, the creditors  raise the ultimate 
repayment from $100 million to $105 million. The debtor is better off 
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much larger future increase in  consumption. The whole game is dia- 
grammed in figure 6.2.  With no debt relief, the equilibrium involves no 
investment and $100 million in  debt repayment. With debt relief, the 
equilibrium involves investment with repayments of $105 million and 
an improved debtor utility of $2 million. Of course, the numbers used 
in this example are arbitrary, and the actual gains from debt relief for 
both the debtor and creditors could be far larger than shown. 
This argument for debt relief would be misplaced if the debtor coun- 
tries are actually in the range of indebtedness in which they will even- 
tually service all of their debts at market terms. However, most of the 
direct and indirect evidence that we have on the market value of claims 
on the major debtor countries shows that the investors indeed believe 
that there is a significant chance that much of the debt will not be fully 
serviced  in  the long run. (See Sachs and  Huizinga  1987 for further 
details on the market valuation of the outstanding debt). 
If this analysis is correct, there may be significant welfare gains from 
forgiving some of the existing stock of debt, rather than piling up more 






Fig. 6.2  The efficiency case for debt relief. Explanation: Without debt 
relief,  the creditor is  repaid  $100  million,  and the debtor 
consumes. Debtor utility  in this case is set at 0.0, and utility 
in the other cases is measured as a deviation from this base- 
line, according to the formula U =  -I,  + max [0,100 + 21, 
- D]/(1.3),  where D is the amount of debt that is due. D  = 
150 in the case of no relief, and D  = 105 in the case of relief. 
I, is 0.0, or $10 million.  Lender utility is measured by  the 
amount of repayment in the second period, and is equal to 
min  [I00 +  2  I,,  D],  which  equals $100 million  if  I, = 0; 
$120 million if I, = $10 million and no relief is granted; and 
$105 million if  I, = $10 million and D is reduced from $150 
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actually to engineer debt relief  is a very difficult one. Equity and ef- 
ficiency considerations will dictate that the existing creditors from all 
classes must coordinate any forgiveness. This  will  pose serious ad- 
ministrative and regulatory problems, since creditors in different coun- 
tries and in different sectors would face very different costs and benefits. 
Commercial banks might even face shareholder lawsuits if  they were 
to forgive some debt without adequate administrative support from the 
bank regulators and perhaps from the legislatures of the various creditor 
countries. Moreover, the debt relief must be designed in a way to limit 
the moral hazard problem of countries intentionally mismanaging their 
international economic policies for the sake of achieving debt relief. 
Of  course debt relief  could come in  all  shapes and  sizes, varying 
from an Alan Garcia-style  cap on debt repayments relative to exports, 
to a conversion of existing debt into new securities with a lower con- 
tractual present value, to a rescheduling at below market interest rates, 
to a scheme in  which  each dollar of  amortization reduces the debt 
outstanding by some multiple of a dollar (by agreement with the cred- 
itors), or finally to an explicit elimination of claims by  the creditors 
without a quid pro quo (as in the cancellation of inter-allied war debts 
in the early 1930s). The relative advantages and disadvantages of these 
various methods are beyond the scope of this paper. 
6.4.2  The Interaction of Debt Relief and Conditionality 
There are really two linkages between a debt overhang and the ef- 
fectiveness of  conditionality, one obvious  and  the other a  bit  more 
subtle, The obvious linkage has already been made: In the absence of 
debt relief, a country may have no incentive to honor a conditionality 
agreement, and to carry through on an economic reform program. The 
foreign debt acts like a tax on adjustment. The debt relief removes the 
tax, and encourages the country to undertake efficient reforms. 
The second linkage occurs when debt relief is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for inducing the country to undertake needed re- 
forms. In the previous  numerical  example, the country chooses to 
undertake reforms once debt relief is granted, even in the absence of 
conditionality. As soon as the debt is reduced from $150 million  to 
$105 million, the country voluntarily reduces current consumption by 
$10 million in order to raise future consumption by $15 million. It might 
easily  have  been  the case, however,  that even with  debt relief,  the 
needed reforms would still look unattractive. This would happen, for 
example, if the government’s rate of time discount is so high that an 
increase in future consumption of $15 million would not justify a cut 
in current consumption of $10 million. 
In such a case, relief  would  not  result in any improvement in the 
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creditors’ point of view. (In the formal modes, the creditors would be 
indifferent between relief and no relief They would receive $100 million 
in either case. In reality, relief would only be granted if there were real 
expected gains, since in  a world of  uncertainty there is always some 
small chance that the loans can be repaid, and there is consequently 
an option value to the creditors in holding on to the face value of their 
claims. (See Krugman 1988 for a discussion of the value of this option 
in the model of uncertainty.) It might still be the case, however, that 
the combination of debt relief and conditionality would raise the welfare 
of both the creditors and the debtor, even though relief by itself and 
conditionality by itself, could not do so. 
To  see  how  this  would  work,  suppose  that  the  following  high- 
conditionality loan package is put together: 
1.  Debt relief, which reduces the overhang of debt from $150 million 
2. IMF lending of $5 million to the country, and with repayment to 
3. The country commits to undertake the export-enhancing reform, 
Assuming that the conditionality is enforced, the country increases  its fu- 
ture productive capacity from $100 million to $120 million. Current con- 
sumption falls by $5 million (since half of the cost of the investment is 
financed by the IMF loan). Future consumption goes up by $9.5 million 
($1 20 million in exports minus $5.5  million in debt repayment to the IMF 
minus $105 million in debt repayment to the original creditors). 
Now, instead of giving up $10 million today to get $15 million in the 
future, the government gives up only $5 million today to get $9.5 million 
in the future. As long as the rate of  time discount is neither too low 
nor too high (specifically, as long as the discount rate is between 0.5 
and 0.9), the country will reject the investment in the absence of the 
IMF-World  Bank loan, but will accept the investment (with condition- 
ality) if it comes with an official loan. In that case, the original creditors 
are better off, since their repayments rise by $5 million relative to the 
case of no reform. The debtor is better off by $9.5 million in the future. 
The IMF breaks even since its loan gets repaid. 
And yet none of this would happen in the absence of debt relief (in 
which case the country reaps no benefit from reform), and in the ab- 
sence of conditionality and new IMF lending (since the country would 
not undertake the investment without new lending, and would not get 
the  new  lending  without  a  credible  commitment to undertake  the 
investment). 
The key to this example is that the investment requires both new 
external financing and debt relief, and the external financing requires 
to $105 million 
the IMF of $5.5 million in the future 
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conditionality, since the country would prefer to borrow abroad and 
then  not  undertake the reform, as in the first example in figure 6.1. 
Again we can resort to a formal game analysis, as shown in figure 6.3. 
In figure 6.3a we  have the case without debt relief.  Any increase in 
debt service capacity goes to the benefit of the foreign creditors. The 
country will  not undertake the investment, and will not consent to a 
conditionality package (or, more likely, the IMF loan will be made, but 
not adhered to). In figure 6.3b we have the case with relief, but without 
conditionality. Again, the country will  not undertake the investment 
out of its own resources, but also will not get any new loans, since 
potential new lenders will correctly believe that new loans will be used 
for consumption purposes. Note that figure 6.3b is the same as figure 
6.2, except for a higher rate of time discount in the debtor country. In 
figure 6.3c, we have the combination of debt relief and new external 
financing with conditionality. 
This example belies two common views: That debt relief must hurt 
the creditors or  that if debt relief helps the creditors, it will be achieved 
without official intervention. The example makes clear that both relief 
and official intervention by means of conditionality are necessary for 
a successful adjustment program to the mutual benefit of the debtor 
and its creditors. 
6.5  Some Implications for the Pace and Phasing of 
Adjustment Programs 
The postwar history of stabilization, liberalization, and conditionality 
can make a pessimist of the most tenacious optimist. Few stabilization 
and liberalization  plans  meet their  initial  objectives, and many  fail 
miserably.  We  have seen that conditionality is inherently limited in its 
capacity to effect  adjustment in  the debtor countries, and  that the 
limitations are even more severe in the presence of a debt overhang. 
In many cases, debt relief might have to be combined with condition- 
ality  to improve  the likelihood  of  success of  IMF and World  Bank 
programs. 
Given these limitations,  it is important to make the objectives of 
conditionality consistent with the limited efficacy of conditionality. Pro- 
grams of the IMF and World bank  should be tailored according to a 
realistic assessment of the possible accomplishments. One of the most 
important issues in  this regard  is  the balancing  of  the demands of 
stabilization  with  those of  longer-term  structural reform. Since the 
major debtor countries suffer from acute macroeconomic disequilibria 
(with inflation rates in Argentina,  Brazil, and Mexico well exceeding 
100 percent per year in 1987), a crucial issue is the balancing of  mac- 
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Debt  relief  with  conditionality.  Explanation: Without  debt 
relief, the debtor’s second period consumption is always 0.0. 
Thus, if  it accepts the $5 million IMF loan, the utility effect 
is  simply  the  change  in  C,, which  equals  -$I0  million 
(= I,)  + $5 million (= IMF loan), or -  $5 million. With debt 
relief,  but  no  new  lending,  the  benefit  of  investment  is 
-  $10 + ($120 -  $105)/1.6,  which is approximately -  1. With 
debt relief and conditionality, the benefit of the IMF package 
is -$5 + [$I20 -  $5(1.1) -  $105]/1.6whichisapproximately 
I. Note that $3  I.  1) represents the repayment of the $5 million 
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The main theme of this section is that structural reform (especially 
a shift towards greater outward orientation and trade liberalization) is 
a very difficult process that takes many years to bring to fruition. The 
process is so difficult economically and politically  that it is likely to 
fail under the best of macroeconomic circumstances, and is in general 
greatly jeopardized by a concurrent macroeconomic stabilization crisis. 
The historical record suggests that adjustment programs rarely succeed 
unless stabilization is their first step, with structural reforms proceeding 
gradually and mostly after macroeconomic balance has been restored. 
The historical record points to a high failure rate in general regarding 
attempts at trade liberalization and a shift towards outward orientation. 
One thoroughly documented record of liberalization experiences can 
be found in the multicountry  study on “Foreign  Trade Regimes and 
Economic Development”  directed  by  Jagdish  Bhagwati  and  Anne 
Krueger at the National Bureau of  Economic Research, and summa- 
rized  in  Krueger (1978). Krueger identified  22  attempts to liberalize 
from a situation of heavy reliance on quantitative restrictions and ex- 
change controls (pp. 219-20).  By her own count, 13 of these episodes 
were unsuccessful  and 9 were successful. Even this count is too op- 
timistic, however, since only 4 of the 9 “success” cases (measured as 
four years of  successful liberalization) proved to be enduring until the 
time of  Krueger’s  study (these cases are Brazil,  1964; South Korea, 
1964; Israel,  1962; and  Colombia,  1967). Perhaps most discouraging 
from the current policy vantage point is the fact that the Latin American 
countries show the most repeated failures in attempts at liberalization. 
And the legacy of past failures can have an important bearing on the 
success of any future plan, as I argue below. 
Table 6.2  gives the breakdown of success and failure, with the dates 
of the program, and the inflation rate of the preceeding year. Two points 
stand out clearly. In almost all cases, the internal imbalances  in the 
economy at the time of the liberalization attempts, as measured by the 
inflation rate, are far smaller than the crisis conditions now confronting 
the Latin American debtors. Second, a high inflation rate seems to be 
a serious hindrance in successful stabilization, since in four of the five 
cases in which liberalization was attempted with an inflation rate above 
30 percent, the experiment failed. Of those five, only Brazil, in  1964, 
demonstrated a successful  liberalization  with  stabilization.  That epi- 
sode might  be the only modern  case of the type of adjustment now 
demanded of  the Latin American  countries. It  had  its  own special 
conditions that allowed  a successful program, not the least of which 
was a strong military dictatorship  that could sharply squeeze real wages 
in the period of disinflation,  1964-67. 
The appropriate link between stabilization and liberalization may be 
the most important policy  issue facing the World Bank in  choosing a 
strategy for high-conditionality lending. The suggestion in table 6.2 that 282  Jeffrey D. Sachs 
Table 6.2  Successful and Unsuccessful Liberalization Attempts, Krueger- 
Bhagwati NBER Study 





































































Source: Krueger (1978, 219-20) 
Notes: Note that the definition of success used here is rather modest: a Phase 111 lib- 
eralization is converted to a Phase IV liberalization for at least four years. Several of 
the  success  cases  ultimately  became failures, as qualitative restrictions (QRs) were 
reapplied. The precise definitions of Phases 111 and IV can be found in Krueger (1978 
26-27).  Phase I11 signifies a trade regime in which the exchange rate has been devalued 
“to reflect  the de facto price of foreign exchange.” QRs may be reduced in scope but 
will generally remain. Phase IV “features greater emphasis on price mechanisms than 
on quantitative restrictions in managing the balance of payments.” 
n.a. = not available. 
an initially high inflation rate can do harm in a liberalization effort finds 
independent support in  several quarters. First, Krueger herself notes 
that liberalization attempts are most  successful in countries that are 
not at the same time pursuing anti-inflationary policies or policies to 
restrict the level of foreign borrowing. One clear reason is that the fear 
of inflation induced governments to undertake inadequate devaluations 
at the start of  a liberalization exercise, and they then failed to keep 
the exchange rate  adjusting downward  in  correction for a domestic 
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Unfortunately,  this  lesson  was  not  learned in  time for the recent 
Southern Cone stabilization exercises, which foundered exactly on this 
conflict of goals. In their excellent survey of these episodes in Argen- 
tina, Chile, and Uruguay,  Corbo and de Melo (1985) conclude that 
“policy inconsistencies were the main reason for the eventual failure 
of the reforms” (p. 864), with the inconsistencies revolving first around 
the use of the exchange rate both to promote trade and restrict inflation, 
and second around the inconsistent application of tariff and regulatory 
policies. Even the tariff inconsistencies can often be traced to the anti- 
inflation program, since unexpected and unplanned tariff changes were 
often made (especially in Argentina) in an attempt to further reduce 
inflation. 
The Southern Cone countries were attempting to pursue two targets, 
low inflation and liberalized trade, and had the freedom to relax a third 
constraint: external borrowing. In the late 1980s, the Latin American 
countries are being  called  upon  to pursue three objectives simulta- 
neously:  lower  inflation,  liberalization,  and reduced dependence on 
foreign borrowing. I am still searching in vain for an historical example 
in  which all three targets were satisfied. (Even if  one could be found 
for the  1960s, it  would  probably  be  possible  to distinguish  it  from 
current circumstances by virtue of  the buoyant growth in world trade 
in  the 1960s.) 
Brazil  and  Korea, in  1964, and Indonesia in  1967 come closest to 
being examples. It is clear, however, that certain factors disposed these 
cases to success. Brazil  and Korea started out their programs with 
sharp real wage reductions, backed by a strong military regime (com- 
parable real wage data for Indonesia are not available). Also, all pro- 
ceeded gradually with liberalization, and after a few years (starting in 
the late 1960s) relied on increasing foreign borrowing in order to main- 
tain the momentum of growth. Finally,  Brazil  and  Korea began  the 
episode with much smaller internal imbalances than are typical in Latin 
America today. Korea had  an inflation  rate of a mere 19.7 pecent in 
the year before the stabilization program began, and Brazil’s rate of 
66.7 percent, while  very  high, is still  dwarfed  by  today’s  rates. (In- 
donesia’s inflation rate reached a very high 1044 percent in  1965.) 
Other research, by Killick et al. (1984) and Lin (1985), agrees with the 
proposition that the simultaneous application of stabilization and wide- 
spread liberalization is unlikely to be sustainable  and successful. Killick 
notes that a degree of liberalization was sought alongside stabilization 
in at least 8 of 23 standby arrangements in 1978-79, with meagre results. 
He concludes “It does not seem that the means available to, or em- 
ployed by, the Fund are strong enough to achieve its liberalisation ob- 
jective in more than rare cases” (p. 238). Lin has made a persuasive 
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and Latin America, that a reduction in inflation should take precedence 
over all other targets, including liberalization, when inflation rates are 
high and prone to rise. In a detailed comparison of the stabilization ex- 
periences of Latin American and East Asian countries, Lin argues that 
the success of the Asian cases was built on a reduction of inflation that 
preceded the liberalization attempts by 5 years or more: 
In both Chile and Argentina, the control of  hyperinflation  and the 
liberalization of the economy occurred at the same time [in the mid- 
1970~1.  This greatly compounded the difficulties of the domestic in- 
dustries by forcing them to cope with both the depressive effects of 
the stabilization policies  and the increased  competition  of foreign 
producers at the same time. This contrasts sharply with the situation 
in Taiwan and South Korea, where the control of hyperinflation pre- 
ceded intensive trade policy reforms by several years (chap. 4,  p. 8). 
Lin also points out at some length that inflation control was supported 
by a worsening rather than an improving of the trade balance, since 
foreign funds were used  to support the governments of Taiwan and 
Korea after the resort to money creation was brought under control: 
In all of the cases mentioned, the eventual contraction of the infla- 
tionary process required the restoration of political stability and pro- 
ductive capacity, with  the injection of massive foreign aid and the 
restriction of deficit financing by the central bank playing important 
roles (ibid.). 
Lin is persuasive in arguing that improvements in the real economy 
have been unlikely  to be long lasting when attempted in a setting of 
rapid inflation and large budget deficits. The analytical arguments in 
favor of  giving anti-inflationary  policies  a strong priority include the 
following: (1) the damage to financial intermediation that occurs in  a 
climate of high inflation, including bank failures, widespread disinter- 
mediation, the absence of financial instruments of long-term maturities, 
and capital flight; (2) the likelihood of major relative price distortions 
in  an inflationary  environment; (3) the damage to tax collection and 
public-sector finances; (4) the damage to real investment and financial 
institutions as governments implement increasingly onerous methods 
of  collecting the  inflation tax (e.g., raising  reserve requirements on 
banks); (5)  the likelihood of policy conflict and policy inconsistency in 
management  of  the exchange rate to meet both  trade and  inflation 
targets; (6) the high transaction costs that are incurred as individuals 
and firms economize on monetary transactions; and (7)  the ever-present 
fear of the public that major new tax increases or capital levies will be 
used in order to close large public-sector deficits. Such fears will con- 
strain the private sector from making the real investment expenditures 
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6.6  Conclusions: Toward an Improved Use of Conditionality 
We  have noted that the efficacy of conditionality is inherently lim- 
ited, and that the current overhang of  debt greatly  complicates the 
situation. In cases of extreme indebtedness, the debt itself might  set 
up incentives that are adverse to significant adjustment or liberaliza- 
tion.  In such a case, partial  debt forgiveness can actually  raise the 
expected repayments to the creditors, while at the same time giving 
greater incentive to the country for favorable adjustment. To be most 
successful, combining debt relief with IMF-World  Bank conditionality 
would  enhance the likelihood  that the debt relief  actually  turns into 
economic reform. 
The historical experience with liberalization alone, and with  stabi- 
lization alone, are not very encouraging. The difficulties of combining 
the two policy initiatives are formidable. The historical record suggests 
that it  is  virtually  impossible to bring inflation  under control, while 
simultaneously trying to liberalize  the economy. One is hard pressed 
to find an example of an economy which  stabilized, liberalized, and 
improved the external position all at the same time. Only South Korea, 
Brazil, and Indonesia seem to provide examples of implementing the 
first two measures, and in those cases the programs were supported 
by a strong military government that substantially reduced real wages 
(at least in Brazil and South Korea) at the outset of the programs, and 
by favorable world conditions, including growing world trade, and after 
a few years, access to foreign borrowing in significant amounts. 
These findings suggest that the IMF  and World Bank should recognize 
the limited efficacy of  conditionality. The following list of guidelines 
for improving the use of conditionality in future lending by the IMF 
and the World Bank would increase the chances of success for LOC 
adjustment programs and improve the effectiveness of conditionality: 
1.  Approve fewer programs. 
2.  Require  more  prior  actions in  cases where the efficacy  of  the 
conditionality is doubtful. 
3.  Encourage governments to enlist the necessary range of political 
support behind the terms of a high-conditionality  program before 
the program is made final. 
4. Approve programs  which allow a buildup of arrears to private 
creditors in cases where the private creditors (a) fail to grant debt 
relief and (b) fail to provide sufficient amounts of new financing. 
5. Encourage the use of debt relief  schemes as a way to enhance 
the likely adherence to conditionality terms. 
6. Narrow the goals of conditionality: Make macroeconomic stabi- 
lization  the first step with  structural reform to be implemented 
only as macroeconomic stability is restored. 286  Jeffrey D. Sachs 
Appendix A 
A Formal Analysis of Conditionality 
The model in this appendix provides a very simple illustration of the 
function of conditionality in international lending. Suppose that there 
are two periods (t =  1,2), and that a government of a small economy 
faces an allocation problem of consumption and investment. In the first 
period, the government can consume (C,  or invest I,  resources, subject 
to the budget  constraint that total  spending,  (C, +  I,, must equal 
domestic output, Q,,  plus borrowing from abroad, D,.  The foreign loans 
carry an interest rate, r, so that repayments due in the second period 
are (1  + r)D,.  Output in the second period is a function of investment 
in the first. As a simple illustration, I assume a linear technology, with 
Q2 = Q, + (I + g)I,,  and also assume that investment opportunities 
are bounded by 1, 5 E  The utility function is U = C, + C2/  (1  + d), 
where d is the rate of pure time preference. For purposes of illustration, 
I assume that we have the following relative parameter values: d > g 
> r. With this ordering, investments are profitable when evaluated at 
world interest rates, but not worthwhile when evaluated according to 
the subjective rate of time discount, d. 
I assume that the country repays all of its foreign borrowing, subject 
to the constraint that C2 2 0. If the debt is so large that full repayment 
would  require C2 < 0, then  the country pays as much  as possible, 
suspends further repayments, and consumes 0 in the second period. 
Under conditions of certainty, the lenders will ration credit such that 
D,  5 QJ(l  + r). Of course C2 = 0 should be taken figuratively. The 
model is virtually unchanged if  the consumption constraint is C2r  M 
is some minimum level of consumption, based on political or economic 
constraints. Also,  C2 implicitly  refers only  to tradable goods (since 
only those goods can be used to finance debt servicing). With C2=  0 
or C2 = M, there could still be  positive levels  of nontradables con- 
sumption. However, to introduce nontradable goods at this point would 
unnecessarily complicate the model. 
Now, to see the role of conditionality, suppose that private lenders 
must make loans before the country chooses the level of investment 
in  the first period, while the IMF or the World Bank, to the contrary, 
can condition a loan on a particular level of investment. The private- 
sector creditor must determine how much investment the country will 
make once a loan is received, since the safe lending constraint D,  5 
Q2/(1 + r) ties the sustainable debt D,  to the level of Q2. 
It is easy to verify that for any level of debt D,,  the country will 
always prefer a zero level of investment, as long as we have the in- 
equality  that d > g.  The reason is  straightforward: an increment  of 
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second period by (1  + g)/(  1 + d)  in terms of first period goods. There- 
fore, the welfare return from an increment of investment is negative. 
Since the country will choose 1, = 0, Q2  will equal Q,,  and the lending 
limit for the commercial banks is given by Ql/(l + r). 
It may be possible for the Fund or the Bank to lend more than this 
safely, if the new loans can be conditioned on investment expenditure. 
Suppose that the World Bank or the IMF can obtain a credible com- 
mitment of the country to invest 0 <  ZI I  Tin return for a stabilization 
or adjustment loan. In such a case, the country will be able to support 
total foreign borrowing in the amount [Ql  + (1 + g)Zl]/(l + r ), which 
is (1 + g)Zl/(l + r) greater than in the absence of the program. Will 
the country agree to such a program? The answer is clearly yes, since 
first-period consumption rises by (1  + g)Zl/(l + r) - 11,  and second- 
period consumption is unchanged (since the rise in income, (1 + g)l,, 
equals the increase in debt servicing). 
It is not necessary, in this scenario, for the World Bank or the IMF 
to actually make the conditionality loan in the amount (1 + g)ZI/(l + r). 
In principle, any smaller loan should attract additional private resources 
to make up the difference. The Fund or the Bank is important only in 
the “seal of good housekeeping”  role rather than as a supplier of funds. 
Appendix B 
A Model of Debt Forgiveness 
To  see how a given stock of debt can interfere with conditionality, let 
us return to the simple two-period model presented in appendix A. We 
now amend the model in two important ways. First, the utility function 
is written in general form as U = U(CI,C2),  with the standard concavity 
conditions. Second, we assume that as of the first period, there is an 
existing stock of  debt, inherited from the past and due in the second 
period. Let D be the legal amount due in the second period (interest 
plus principal), and let S denote the actual debt servicing in that period 
(S may be a stochastic variable as of the first period). The creditors 
might,  we shall see, be  willing to forgive some of the debt as of the 
first period, in which case we denote the post-forgiveness amount due 
as R.  Thus, with D > R, there is some formal forgiveness of the debt 
as of the first period, and with R > S,  there is a partial default in the 
second period (since as of the second period, R is due and only S  is 
actually repaid). The production technology is as before: Q2 = Q, + 
Suppose that the country is cut off from the world capital markets 
by virtue of the preexisting stock of debt, D, or by virtue of its general 
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lack of creditworthiness, and ignore conditionality lending for the mo- 
ment. All investment therefore comes from internal savings. We assume 
as before that as of the second period the country repays as much of 
the foreign debt as it can. If savings and consumption allocations are 
made by a central planner, then the planner’s problem is: 
max  U(CI,C2)  such that C, = Ql - ZI 
II 
CZ  =  Q2(11)  - s 
S  = min(R, Q,). 
The creditors have a corresponding problem.  Should they demand 
full repayment of the debt, D, or should they agree as of thejrst  period 
to  forgive  part  of  the  debt,  and  to demand  a  smaller  repayment, 
R < D? Assuming that the creditor “moves first”  by announcing the 
debt decision, and that the debtor country thereafter solves the optimal 
allocation problem, the creditor must solve the following: 
max S such that R 5  D and 
R 
S is the solution to the debtor problem given above. 
In words, the debtor chooses the repayment level, R, that maximizes 
actual debt servicing, S,  subject to the constraint that R be less than 
or equal to the original debt, D. 
As noted in the text, it might seem, and it is often argued as if, the 
creditor should simply hold out for the maximum repayment, D, and 
take whatever he can get in the second period. Such a strategy, how- 
ever, can be improved upon. 
Consider the debtor’s problem, taking R as a parameter. For low 
values of R, the debtor will repay everything, since it will turn out that 
R < Q2(Zl).  Thus, the allocation problem becomes one of maximizing 
U(CI,C2)  such that C, = Q, -  I,,  and C2 = Q2  (II)  -  R. The interior 
solution to this problem  sets the gross rate of return on investment, 
(1 + g), equal to the marginal rate of  substitution  between first and 
second period consumption: U,/U,. Take, as an illustration, the special 
case  of  additively  separable  utility,  U(CI,CZ) =  U(CJ +  U(C2)/ 
(1  +  d).  The planner  then  sets (1 + g) =  (1 + d)U’ (Ql -  ZJU’ 
[QZ  (I,) - R]. It is then easy to verify that ZI  is an increasing function 
of  R  in  this range. In a  sense, high  debt repayments are a  spur to 
adjustment. The social planner knows that there is a big reduction to 
real cash flow next period, because of the debt repayment, and there- 
fore he smooths consumption across periods by saving today and in- 
vesting more in order to raise second-period output. 
For large values of  R, however, it will be the case that R > Q,(Zl) 
so that the debtor will not make the full repayment, R. In that case, 
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C, = Ql - ZI  and C2 = 0. Clearly, for very high levels of debt, the 
optimal policy is zero investment, since C2 is fixed at O! Let R* be the 
minimum  repayment due at which  ZI  is  set at zero.  For R  2 R*, 
ZI  =  0. For R  above R*, the  entire increase in GDP due to higher 
investment would accrue to the existing creditors, rather than to the 
country itself. The debt is so high that the country works for the bank 
rather than for itself. The equilibrium level of utility is given as U(QI,O). 
Call this threshhold level of utility U*. The country’s utility can never 
fall below this level, since it is always feasible for the country to make 
no investments and to pay as much of the debt as is feasible, subject 
to the constraint C2  2  0. At high levels of debt, the actual debt servicing 
is equal to Q2 [ZI  = 01  = QI. 
The key point from the creditor’s point of view is that actual repay- 
ments, S, will fall when R increases above R*, since investment, 11, 
falls to zero. The resource base from which the country makes debt 
repayments shrinks, so that actual repayments decline. Thus, for R 5 
R*, we have S  = R; for R > R*, we have S < R* < R. 
Now let us return to the creditor’s problem.  For levels of debt, D, 
less than the threshhold R*, it is clear that the creditors should hold 
out for full repayment. Indeed, the higher  the level of the debt, the 
greater will be the “adjustment” in the debtor country, with adjustment 
measured by the amount of first period investment. However, for D > 
R*, it is a mistake to hold  out for full repayment. The creditors will 
get more repayment by agreeing in the first period to lower the required 
debt repayments in the second! Forgiving debt can be to the advantage 
of  the creditors, by  spurring investment in  the debtor country, and 
thereby spurring the means of the debtor to service the debt. 
The two-period model just explored lends itself to a standard dia- 
grammatic  analysis, as in  figure  6.4. As usual, the X-axis measures 
production and consumption in the first period, and the Y-axis measures 
production  and  consumption in the second period.  Note that  since 
C1  = Ql -  ZIandC2  = max(O,Q, - D) = max[O,Ql + (1 + g)Z1 -  D],we 
can draw the consumption possibility frontier  as  C2 = max[O, (2 + g)Ql 
- (1 + g)C1 - D]. When D  = 0, the consumption frontier is given 
by the curve CC in figure 6.l(a). The point Q  = (Ql,Ql)  is the con- 
sumption point when I, = 0; the CC curve has slope - (1 + g),  since 
each increment of foregone consumption in the first-period raises sec- 
ond-period consumption by (1 + g). 
When D > 0, the consumption frontier shifts downward as in figures 
6.l(b) and 6.l(c). The curve shifts vertically downward by the amount 
D, except if D is so large that C2  would turn negative if fully repaid. 
The resulting CC curve is shown for small levels of D (< Ql)  in figure 
6.l(b), and for large level of debt D (> Q,) in figure 6.l(c). In figure 
6.l(c) note that the CC curve is kinked, because of the restriction that 
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The social planner picks the point on the CC schedule that maximizes 
domestic welfare. In figure 6.4(a), equilibrium is at the point A where 
CC is tangent to the indifference curve, U.  Note that the horizontal 
distance between A and Q is the level of optimal first-period investment, 
I,. In figure 6.4(b), equilibrium is at B. Note that the existence of a 
small amount of foreign debt, D, spurs investment (seen by the fact 
that the  horizontal  distance from B  to Q,  equal to ZI,  exceeds the 
distance from A to Q). In this case, the foreign debt drives the social 
planner  to smooth consumption by reducing  C,  in  order to raise  Q2 
enough to service the debt. In figure 6.4(c), the optimal policy is to set 
II = 0, and to consume at the point E, with CI = Ql,  C2 = 0. The 
point here is straightforward. Since D is so large that it will not be fully 
repaid, each increment of I,  raises second-period output without raising 
second-period consumption. In such circumstances there is no incen- 
tive to invest! With zero investment, Q2 = Ql and actual repayment 
in period 2 is S = el,  as shown. 
The key point of this section is that in case (c) the creditors can raise 
the debt repayments through debt forgiveness. Instead of demanding D, 
they can instead demand a smaller amount, R.  The result is a new equi- 
librium at point F. The country undertakes more investment and there- 
fore has more resources with which to service the debt. As drawn, the debt 
writedown raises debt repayments (from S  to R)  and leaves the country’s 
utility unchanged. It is obvious that a greater level of debt forgiveness 
could leave both the country and the creditors better off than at point E. 
It might be objected that the foregoing model is artificial, in that it 
establishes a zone in which a high external debt level makes second- 
period  investment completely worthless from the country’s point  of 
view. To  see a more nuanced view, we could use the model of default 
and debt renegotiation in Sachs and Cohen (1985). Suppose that if  the 
country defaults, the retaliation penalty from the creditors is a fraction, 
h, of national GDP. Thus, if  the country repays the debt due, second 
period consumption is  Q2 - R. If  instead it defaults, it saves repay- 
ments, R,  but suffers a loss of GDP equal to he2,  so that second period 
consumption would  be C,  =  (I - h)Q2.  Clearly, the country would 
find default attractive whenever R > he2.  Finally, suppose that in lieu 
of default with retaliation, we can assume that in the second period if 
R > he2,  the creditors and debtor reach a cooperative outcome such 
that the debtors pay a fraction of the repayment due, in the amount 
he2,  and the creditors agree to forego any further retaliation. 
In this case, the debtor’s problem can be restated as follows: 
max U(CI,C2)  such that  C, = Ql -  I, 
CZ  = Q*VJ - s 
S  = min [R,  (1 - h)Qz(Zl)  1. C2I Qz 
Q; 
Cose  (a  1 No Debt 
Cose  ( b) Low Debt 
I  c 
Q1  Cl, Qi 
Cose  (c)  High Debt 
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In this  case, the marginal  return to investment in the zone in which 
debt is fully repaid is simply (1  + g). On the other hand, in the region 
in which debt is not fully repaid, the marginal return to investment is 
(1 - h)  (1  + g). The overhang of debt now imposes a marginal tax of 
h percent  on the social return to investment. Once again, it is easy to 
show that explicit debt relief can in fact raise the creditors’ eventual 
repayments, and can spur “adjustment” (i-e.,  investment) in the debtor 
country, by  eliminating the implicit  “marginal  tax”  on the returns to 
investment. 
Appendix C 
The Interaction of  Debt Relief and Conditionality 
In this appendix, we combine the models of appendix A and appendix 
B, to illustrate the case in which the combination of conditionality and 
debt relief  is both necessary and sufficient  for raising the welfare  of 
both creditors and debtors. 
For convenience, we work with the case of linear utility and linear 
technology. The government objective function is given as: 
u = CI  + C,/(l  + 6). 
Q, = QI  + (1  + g)Z, 
Production in period 2 is given as: 
I, 5 r 
There is an initial overhang of debt in the second period, D2,  with 
D, > Q, + (1  + g) E 
In the absence of  debt relief,  the government will  undertake zero 
investment spending in the first period. Moreover, the country would 
not agree to any binding  package of  new official  lending with  condi- 
tionality  if  the official  lenders were financing  anything  less than  100 
percent of the investment. Suppose that a share, s, of the investment 
could  be financed  with  an IMF-World  Bank  loan.  Then initial  con- 
sumption would fall by  (1 - s) * I,,  i.e., by the amount not financed 
externally. Future consumption would not rise at all, however, since 
after repayment to the IMF-World  Bank, and partial repayment to the 
original creditors, nothing would be left over for the country. 
Next, suppose that there is debt relief alone, without the involvement 
of the official institutions. Suppose, for example, that the debt is re- 
duced to the level @.  Then, the country will surely repay the remaining 
debt in the second period. However, it will  still choose to do no in- 293  Conditionality, Debt Relief, and the Debt Crisis 
vestment spending, as long as the rate of time discount, d, is greater 
than the return to investment, g. Moreover, in the absence of condi- 
tionality, it would not be safe to make new loans to the country even 
after the debt is written  down to Q1,  since the country will  use the 
loans for consumption, and not for investment. 
Now,  suppose  that  the  debt  relief  is  combined  with  a  high- 
conditionality loan, in the following manner. The country undertakes 
to make investment, ZI,  with the share, s, to be financed by the IMF- 
World Bank. The initial debt is reduced to (Q, + e), where e is a small 
amount. First period consumption falls by (1 - s)  ZI,  and second period 
output rises by (I + g)Z1.  Second-period consumption now rises in the 
amount (1  + g)ZI -  s (1  + r)  ZI - e, which will surely be positive as 
long as e is sufficiently small. (Note that the rise in consumption equals 
the rise in output, minus the repayment to the IMF, minus the incre- 
ment, e, in  repayment to the original creditors above the  level el). 
Now, as long as the rate of time discount, d, is sufficiently small or the 
share of IMF-World  Bank financing is sufficiently large, then the overall 
effect on the government’s objective function is positive. Specifically, 
the condition for an improvement in the government’s objective func- 
tion is: 
-(I  - s)  I, + [ (I  + g)Z1 -  s I,  (1 + r) - e]/(l  + d) > 0. 
Since g > r, and e is close to 0.0, the condition for improvement is 
surely satisfied for s  very close to 1.0, or d very close to 0.0, and may 
well be satisfied for intermediate values of s and d. 
1. Berg and Batchelder (1985) have done a very fine recent paper that reaches 
similar conclusions. 
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